The Pacific Flashpoint

The current administration is treating the Pacific not just as a zone of economic rivalry, but as a likely stage for future conflict. The Thucydides Trap, when a rising power challenges an incumbent, feels more like a strategic roadmap than a theory in the U.S.-China dynamic.

U.S. intelligence, including the CIA, has flagged 2027 as a year by which Xi Jinping has instructed China’s military to be ready for potential action, particularly around Taiwan. This isn’t a prediction of war, it’s a benchmark for capability.

Interestingly, former President Trump’s foreign policy, often criticized for its unpredictability may have inadvertently previewed a shift in the global order. His challenge to multilateralism exposed a hard truth: the U.S. may no longer be structurally prepared for prolonged, industrial-scale conflict.

If the Pacific does become the next geopolitical fault line, it will test more than strategy. It will test our ability to build, scale, and sustain, something that once defined American strength in WWII but now risks becoming a critical weakness.

What’s needed next:

• Reinvest in domestic manufacturing, especially in defense-critical supply chains like semiconductors, energy, and advanced materials.

• Strengthen alliances, not just militarily, but through joint industrial and technology partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

• Modernize deterrence strategy, with a focus on resilience, autonomy, and AI-enhanced decision advantage.

• Close the civilian-military divide, by communicating the stakes to the public and rebuilding a national narrative of preparedness.